The experiments in this article were conducted to observe the automatic activation of gender stereotypes and to assess theoretically specified conditions under which such stereotype priming may be moderated. Across 4 experiments, 3 patterns of data were observed: (a) evidence of stereotype priming under baseline conditions of intention and high cognitive constraints, (b) significant reduction of stereotype priming when a counterstereotype intention was formed even though cognitive constraints were high, and (c) complete reversal of stereotype priming when a counterstereotype intention was formed and cognitive constraints were low. These data support proposals that stereotypes may be automatically activated as well as proposals that perceivers can control and even eliminate such effects.
Among the significant recent advances in social psychology is the study of unconscious and automatic processes in human thought and behavior (Bargh, 1994; Bornstein & Pittman, 1992; Greenwald, 1992; Kihlstrom, 1990; Uleman & Bargh, 1989) . Research on stereotyping has begun to benefit from such an analysis, as demonstrated by a number of studies that have shown how stereotypes may influence responses without perceivers' awareness of that influence (e.g., Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993; Devine, 1989; Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994; Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994) . Lack of awareness, however, is only one of the conditions under which an automatic process may be revealed (Bargh, 1989 (Bargh, , 1994 . Perceiver intentions and cognitive resources may also determine the extent to which a response reflects an automatic or a controlled process (see Bargh, 1989 Bargh, , 1994 Kihlstrom, 1990) . That is, automatic processes may result in stereotyping if perceivers do not have an intention to avoid the influence of such processes or if the necessary cognitive resources are not available for perceivers to readily carry out their intention, regardless of perceivers' awareness of the influence of stereotypes on judgment.
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That perceiver intentions and cognitive resources may be important factors in the activation and influence of stereotypes has important theoretical and practical implications. For theory, an examination of the controllability of stereotyping can inform one about the conditions under which perceivers can and will oppose an automatic process. Whether perceivers are able to control the influence of stereotypes on their response, in turn, has implications for a variety of situations in which stereotypes can have serious consequences. However, little research has examined the role of perceiver intentions and cognitive constraints in determining the operation of automatic and controlled processes in stereotyping with procedures established to reveal the interplay of these opposing processes.
The purpose of this research was twofold: (a) to examine the automatic processes that may underlie stereotyping and (b) to examine the role of intention and cognitive resources in moderating the influence of such processes on response. The first goal of the research was to improve and extend initial demonstrations of the automaticity with which stereotypes may be primed, as revealed by a semantic priming procedure developed for such a purpose. A second, more important goal of the present research was to provide an assessment of the conditions under which automatic processes need not result in a stereotypic response. The priming procedures used in the present research readily permit observation of competing tendencies toward the automatic expression of stereotypes and the control that may be exerted against such expression. An examination of these opposing processes in action allows much to be learned about the conditions that facilitate and inhibit stereotyping.
In light of the present research goals, it is useful to consider the stereotyping process in more detail and to determine where automatic and controlled processes might have an effect. Several models of stereotyping distinguish between stereotype activation (categorization) and stereotype application as sequential steps in stereotyping (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991 ) . That is, stereotypes cannot be used in judgment if those stereotypes have not been previously activated by situational cues, such as the target's skin color or clothing. Hence, stereotype activation is a necessary but not a sufficient step in stereotyping. For the stereotyping process to be 1 143 completed, the perceiver must use the a6tivated stereotypic information in judgment (stereotype application).
Where in this stereotyping sequence do automatic and controlled processes play a role? Theories of stereotyping generally hold that stereotype activation is an automatic process that operates when the appropriate situational cue is present (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) . In contrast, the use of the activated stereotypic information in judgment is believed to be under the perceiver's control. In short, stereotype activation is believed to be an automatic process, whereas stereotype application is believed to be a controlled, or at least a controllable, process. Although a number of studies have demonstrated that perceivers can indeed reduce stereotyping under appropriate conditions (e.g., Devine, 1989; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Monteith, 1993; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987) , it was assumed that in those studies control was exerted over stereotype application and not stereotype activation. Indeed, one study that attempted to examine separately the automaticity of stereotype activation and application found that stereotype activation may not be unconditionally automatic (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991 ) , a result consistent with theories of automaticity that specify that most automatic processes are conditional (e.g., Anthony & Graham, 1985; Bargh, 1994) .
Although the point at which a measure of stereotype activation becomes a measure of the influence of stereotypes on response (i.e., stereotype application) is not easily set, the procedures used in the present research are better conceptualized as assessing stereotype activation or priming. Hence, the present research provides tests of the automaticity of stereotype priming and the conditions under which control may be brought to bear on stereotype priming, as assessed by a semantic priming procedure. Four experiments were conducted to examine gender stereotype priming under varying conditions of intention and cognitive constraints. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate baseline stereotype priming under high cognitive constraints and in the absence of an intentional stereotype strategy. These experiments extend previous research by examining the automatic activation of gender associations in the presence of both personality trait and nontrait attributes. Experiments 3 and 4, in turn, provide evidence for conditions under which perceivers may be able to moderate stereotype priming. That is, participants' intentions (stereotype vs. counterstereotype) and constraints on cognitive resources were simultaneously manipulated. The interaction of these variables is shown to produce a gradient of outcomes from strong stereotype priming to a complete reversal of the effect.
Experiment 1
Semantic priming procedures have shown that people are faster to respond to a target if it is closely paired in space and time with a semantically related word (e.g., doctor-nurse) than if it is paired with a semantically unrelated word (e.g., treenurse; e.g., Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; Neely, 1977; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Schvaneveldt & Meyer, 1973) . Such effects indicate that the time it takes people to react to paired concepts is a measure of the strength with which the concepts are semantically associated, with faster reaction times (RTs) to the target indicating greater strength of association between prime and target (see Neely, 1991; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988 ; for an analysis of automaticity in evaluation or attitudes, see Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986) .
A study by Neely (1977) established the automaticity of such RT effects. Specifically, Neely showed that at very short presentation intervals (less than 500 ms), perceivers were faster to respond on semantically related trials than on semantically unrelated trials, even though they were actively trying to avoid semantic associations. The importance of this finding was immediately obvious, and the field has responded by using Neely's 500-ms cutoff as a standard to define the automaticity boundary of semantic priming.
Recent research has adapted the semantic priming procedure to study gender and race stereotypes on the assumption that stereotypes are a particular class of semantic associations (see Banaji & Hardin, in press; Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990) . That is, just as semantically related concepts automatically facilitate responses as compared with semantically unrelated concepts (e.g., sleep--snore vs. sleep-pencil), stereotypically related concepts ought to automatically facilitate responses to a greater extent than concepts inconsistent with stereotypes (e.g., gentle-she vs. gentle-he). A study by Dovidio et at. provided one of the first demonstrations using RT measures of stereotype priming.~ In that experiment, participants were presented with a sequence of two words, a prime category followed by a target trait (e.g., Black-musical, White-ambitious). Participants were asked to perform a simple judgment on the target trait, and their response time was taken as a measure of the strength of association between the category and the trait. The activation of race stereotypes was shown through participants' faster responses to traits that were stereotypic of the prime category (e.g., White-ambitious) than to traits that were counterstereotypic of the prime category (e.g., White-musical).
Particular features of Dovidio et al.'s (1986) procedure, however, leave open the question of whether the observed stereotype priming effect revealed the operation of automatic processes. For example, the prime was presented for 2,000 ms followed by a blank screen for 500 ms before the target appeared. As noted earlier, previous research has demonstrated that this 2,500-ms stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) allows controlled processes to determine the response (Neely, 1977) . Moreover, participants in Dovidio et al.'s study were instructed to think of the typical member of the prime category and to judge whether the target attribute could ever be true of members of the category. Such a task clearly implicates the involvement of perceivers' intention in producing a stereotypic response, a factor that may also determine the automaticity of a response (Bargh, 1994) . Hence, participants in this research had an intention to associ~Two other studies used a similar procedure. Gaertner and McLaughlin ( 1983 ) , however, used stereotypic attributes for European Americans that were all positive and attributes for African Americans that were all negative. Similarly, the experimental stimuli used by Perdue and Gurtman (1990) were chosen for their valence and not their stereotypicality. These procedures make the results in both studies ambiguous as to whether they revealed the operation of social category stereotypes or attitudes.
ate attributes with a social group (stereotype), and cognitive constraints were low enough for such an intention to significantly influence the response.
Banaji and Hardin (in press) introduced timing and judgment parameters designed to increase the likelihood of capturing more automatic than controlled processes in the priming of gender stereotypes. Similar to Dovidio et al.'s (1986) study, participants in Banaji and Hardin's studies were presented with a sequence of two words and asked to perform a simple judgment on the second target word (e.g., "Is the target a male or female pronoun?"). However, Banaji and Hardin reduced the SOA to 300 ms and did not have participants deliberate on the association between the prime and the target. Automatic stereotype priming was revealed in their experiments in the form of faster responses to male targets following stereotypically masculine roles and occupations and faster responses to female targets following stereotypically feminine roles and occupations (e.g., engineer-he and nurse-she), as compared with counterstereotypic prime-target pairs (e.g., nurse-he and engineer-she). The strength of this effect was demonstrated by the findings that (a) participants' awareness that stereotypes may have influenced their response did not reduce the effect, (b) participants' explicit beliefs about gender stereotypes did not moderate the effect, and (c) the effect was obtained even when participants' task was irrelevant to gender (i.e., "Is the target a pronoun or not?").
Banaji and Hardin (in press), however, did not control for the valence of their stimuli, a factor that has been shown to influence automatic responding (see Bargh et al., 1992; Fazio et al., 1986) . In addition, their research examined only the automatic priming of nontrait stereotypes (i.e., gender-typed occupations and roles), whereas early attempts to study stereotype priming, indeed much of stereotyping research, focused entirely on personality traits (e.g., Dovidio et al., 1986; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990) . Clearly, a full analysis of stereotype priming must include both positive and negative personality traits and nontraits (Anderson & Klatzky, 1987; Anderson, Klatzky, & Murray, 1990; Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981; Deaux & Kite, 1985; Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Eagly & Steffen, 1984) . Therefore, the main purpose of Experiment 1 was to further establish a procedure through which automatic gender stereotype priming could be assessed by using a more representative stimulus set of both positive and negative personality traits and nontraits.
Overview and Hypothesis
Participants were presented with multiple pairs of words on a microcomputer. The first, or prime, word was either a personality trait or a nontrait (i.e., an activity, an object, or a profession), and the second, or target, word was a common male or female first name (350-ms SOA). Participants were instructed to judge as quickly and accurately as possible whether the target was a male name or a female name. We predicted that gender stereotype priming would be revealed through participants' faster responses on stereotypic trials (same-gendered prime and target) than on counterstereotypic trials (differentgendered prime and target) under these baseline conditions, that is, at a 350-ms SOA and in the absence of a specific stereotype intention. 2
Method Participants
Seventy-three undergraduate students at Yale University ( 27 men and 46 women ) participated in a study on "judging words" for either experimental credit in partial fulfillment of a course requirement ( n = 53 ) or monetary compensation (n = 20).
Materials
Participants completed a series of trials on which they responded to a male or a female target name that was immediately preceded by a stereotypie, a counterstereotypic, or a gender-neutral prime attribute.
Primes. One third of the primes were stereotypieally masculine, one third were stereotypically feminine, and one third were gender-neutral. Half of the primes in each category were evaluatively positive and half were evaluatively negative. Of the set of masculine and feminine primes, half were traits and half were nontraits. All oftbe gender-neutral primes were nontraits.
The stereotypic personality traits were generated by consulting wellestablished measures of gender stereotypes (e.g., Bem, 1981; Rosenkrantz, Vogel, Bee, Broverman, & Broverman, 1968; Spenee, Helmreich & Stapp, 1974 . Because such data do not exist for gender stereotypic nontraits, these stimuli were generated by the experimenters in several categories: appearance (e.g., petite, tall ), activities (e.g., ballet, sports), objects (e.g., flowers, briefcase), professions (e.g., secretary, mechanic), and roles (e.g., mistress, master). Both traits and nontraits were then given to 12 undergraduates to obtain ratings of the attributes' valence. On the basis of the results of this pretest, the positive and negative primes in each gender category ( male, female, and gender-neutral ) were selected such that they were approximately equal in valence to those of the other categories. On a 7-point scale ranging from 0 (least likable) to 6 (most likable), the mean valence ratings for positive primes were 4.36 for masculine traits, 4.47 for feminine traits, 3.87 for masculine nontraits, 3.65 for feminine nontraits, and 3.94 for genderneutral nontraits. The mean valence ratings for negative primes were 1.32 for masculine traits, 1.67 for feminine traits, 2.29 for masculine nontraits, 2.34 for feminine nontraits, and 1.81 for gender-neutral nontraits. In addition, the primes in each gender category were approximately equal in length and frequency ( Kucera & Francis, 1967 ) . On the basis oftbese selection criteria, a list of 16 masculine traits, 16 feminine traits, 16 masculine nontraits, 16 feminine nontraits, and 32 genderneutral nontraits was created, with positive and negative terms equally represented in each category (see Appendix A for a full list of the primes).
Targets. Although the majority of the target names were selected from those used by Banaji and Hardin (in press ), additional names were generated to increase further the comparability of male and female names. As a result, male and female names were matched on first letter and length, with every female name having a male counterpart that was matched on first letter and length. Foreign names, names that were ambiguously male or female (e.g., Pat, Chris), and any name that would not be easily recognized as a name were excluded. This procedure resulted in 48 male and 48 female names ( see Appendix B for a full list of the target names).
2 It is important to note that although priming effects are generally believed to index the strength of association between prime and target, different theories of the underlying process have been proposed. A discussion of these models is beyond the scope of this article (see Neely, 1991; Ratcliff& McKoon, 1988) , but suffice it to say that it cannot be presumed that priming effects are due to spreading activation from the prime to the target.
Apparatus
The experimental task was administered on IBM PS2/50 microcomputers running Micro-Experimental Laboratory software (Schneider, 1990) . The stimuli were presented in the center of the screen as white words on a black background. All letters comprising the prime and target stimuli were approximately 15 mm tall and easily visible to participants. Supplementary code was written to ensure precise control over the timing of stimulus presentations through the use of a paletteswitching technique. Tests indicated that the mean stimulus presentation times were accurate to within 1 ms, with standard deviations of less than 0.1 ms.
Procedure
Participants worked in individual rooms, and all instructions were presented on the computer screen. Participants were allowed as much time as needed to read the instructions, and they were provided with several opportunities for clarification. Because the objective in this experiment was to establish a procedure to assess automatic stereotype priming under baseline conditions, the involvement of controlled processes (stereotype intentions) was minimized as much as possible. The experiment was presented as an investigation of the speed and the accuracy with which people can make judgments about a target in the presence of irrelevant information; no mention was made of the role of gender stereotypes in the task or why male and female names were the targets. Participants were not given any specific strategy to use, and attempts were made to downplay the role of gender stereotypes in the task, to reduce the possibility that participants would try to alter their response strategically. The salience of the gender association between the prime and the target was minimized by using only gender-neutral primes in the 10 practice trials and the first 20 (buffer) trials of each block. Moreover, although we use the terms prime and target to refer to the first and second trial words, respectively, only target was used in the instructions to participants; the prime was always designated by the phrase "the first word."
Participants were told that they would see an orienting stimulus (+) followed by two words, one presented after the other. They were instructed to "do nothing with the first word of the pair, which is irrelevant to your judgment" and to "simply judge whether the second target word is a male or female name." The F and J keys on the keyboard were labeled [M] and [F] to represent the male and female response keys, respectively, and their positions, left or right, were counterbalanced across participants. Participants were instructed to place an index finger on each key and to keep their fingers in that position throughout the experiment except during breaks. The time it took a participant to respond to the target from its onset was recorded, as well as the accuracy in judging whether the target was a male or a female name. If the participant made a correct judgment, the next trial began. If the participant made an incorrect judgment, a tone indicated that an error had been made and then the next trial began.
For all trials, an orienting stimulus (+) was presented for 500 ms, followed by the prime for 150 ms, a blank screen for 200 ms, and then the target, which remained "on the screen until the participant made a response (i.e., a 350-ms SOA ). Trials were separated by approximately 1,000 ms, resulting in a 1,500-ms interval between the offset of a target and the onset of the next trial prime. Participants completed two blocks of trials, each consisting of 20 buffer and 96 experimental trials. Participants were given a l-min break between blocks. At the end of the break, a tone sounded and participants were instructed to press the space bar to continue the experiment. All the primes and the targets in Block 1 were repeated in Block 2. For each trial, the prime and the target were randomly selected, with the constraint that each prime be paired with a male target in one block and with a female target in the other block. Of the experimental trials, 64 were stereotypic (e.g., hostile-Jack, dependent-Jane), 64 were counterstereotypic (e.g., dependent-David, hostile-Diane), and 64 were gender-neutral (e.g., thorn-Frank, lice-Flora) prime trials. Across participants, all primes were paired approximately equally often with each target name.
After participants had completed the priming task, they were asked to give their impressions of the task, including what they thought the experimental hypothesis was. Following a 5-min break, participants completed a second priming task. This second task was designed to address several independent theoretical issues, and hence, it is presented separately as Experiment 3.
The experimental design was a 3 (prime gender: masculine vs. feminine vs. neutral) × 2 (target gender: male vs. female) × 2 (prime type: trait vs. nontrait) 3 × 2 (prime valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (participant gender: male vs. female) mixed design with all but participant gender manipulated within subjects.
Results
Of primary interest was the speed with which participants responded to stereotypic prime-target trials (e.g., gentle-Jane, strong-John) as compared with counterstereotypic primetarget trials (e.g., gentle-John, strong-Jane). Each participant completed 128 such trials, resulting in a total of 9,344 data points. Trials on which participants incorrectly classified the target name were eliminated (4% error rate). In addition, trials on which participants responded slower than three standard deviations from the mean were considered to be invalid and therefore were eliminated (n = 153; 2% of nonerror trials, distributed approximately equally across conditions; Ratcliff, 1993 ) . These procedures resulted in a final data set containing 8,840 observations across 73 participants. Finally, because of the positively skewed nature of RT data, they were log transformed before the statistical analysis was conducted because of this transformation's better approximation to a normal distribution (see Fazio, 1990; Ratcliff, 1993) . 4 We expected that stereotype priming would be revealed through participants' faster responses to stereotypic trials than to counterstereotypic trials. Statistically, this effect would be demonstrated by a Prime Gender × Target Gender interaction, with faster responses to trials on which the prime-target gender matched than to trials on which the prime-target gender did not match. More specifically, for each gender, stereotype priming is indicated by two comparisons. Automatic activation of male stereotypes is indicated by faster responses to male targets following masculine primes than to male targets following feminine primes and faster responses to male targets than to female targets following masculine primes. In contrast, automatic activation of female stereotypes is indicated by faster responses to female targets following feminine primes than to female targets following masculine primes and faster responses to female targets than to male targets following feminine primes.
To test these predictions, we conducted a 2 (prime gender: masculine vs. feminine) × 2 (target gender: male vs. female) × 2 (prime type: trait vs. nontrait) × 2 (prime valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (participant gender: male vs. female) mixed model analysis of variance (ANOVA) on RTs (all variables except participant gender were repeated measures). 5 A statistically significant Prime Gender X Target Gender interaction provided evidence for the automatic activation of both male and female stereotypes, F( 1, 72) = 14.64, p < .001 (Cohen's d = 0.62). As shown in Figure 1 , planned t tests revealed that participants were (a) faster to respond to male targets following masculine primes than following feminine primes, t(72) = 2.86, p < .01; (b) faster to respond to male targets than to female targets following masculine primes, t(72) = 2.94, p < .01; and (c) faster to respond to female targets following feminine primes than following masculine primes, t(72) = 2.49, p < .05. Participants' response times to male and female targets did not significantly differ following feminine primes, t(72) = 1.29. Hence, three of the four critical comparisons provided support for gender stereotype priming.
These results replicate previous research (e.g., Banaji & Hardin, in press) by showing that gender stereotypes may be activated and influence responses under conditions established to reveal an automatic process, that is, a 350-ms SOA and in the absence of specific stereotype intentions. The results of Experiment 1 extend those obtained by Banaji and Hardin by showing the automatic activation of both positive and negative male and female stereotypes. However, a three-way Prime Type x Prime Gender X Target Gender interaction, F( 1, 72) = 9.65, p < .01, revealed that the stereotype priming effect was very strong for nontrait attributes, F( 1, 72) = 21.64, p < .001 (see Table 1 ), but nonsignificant for personality-trait attributes, F( 1, 72) = 0.32.
Although our primary interest was in the comparison of RT data from stereotypic versus counterstereotypic prime-target Note. Means with different subscripts differ significantly (p < .05). SOA = stimulus onset asynchrony. trials, it is of some interest to also compare these results with participants' baseline responses on gender-neutral prime trials. That is, RTs following gender-neutral primes versus stereotypic or counterstereotypic primes can show how stereotypic and counterstereotypic attributes are represented in relation to the target groups (men and women). Although these experiments were not designed to test specific hypotheses regarding the outcome of gender-neutral prime trials and such trials have not been established as a baseline measure of response, precluding analyses of facilitation versus inhibition, a few different results can be predicted. For example, gender-neutral attributes may produce slower RTs than stereotypic attributes but faster RTs than counterstereotypic attributes, because stereotypic attributes are represented as more strongly associated with the target groups than are gender-neutral attributes, and counterstereotypic attributes are represented as the least strongly associated with the groups. Alternatively, RTs on gender-neutral prime trials may be similar to those on counterstereotypic trials, because both gender-neutral and counterstereotypic attributes are simply more weakly associated with the target groups than are stereotypic attributes.
Because the gender-neutral primes were nontraits, a second analysis was conducted on the RT data from trials with only nontrait primes. A 3 (prime gender: masculine vs. feminine vs. neutral) X 2 (target gender: male vs. female) repeated measures ANOVA showed that gender-neutral primes did not significantly differentially affect responses to male and female targets, unlike the masculine and feminine primes. That is, mean responses to male ( 540 ms) and female ( 548 ms) targets following gender-neutral primes did not statistically differ. In addition, responses to targets on gender-neutral prime trials were generally slower than responses on stereotypic trials but faster than responses on counterstereotypic trials (see Table 1 ). Accordingly, s Participant gender and prime valence did not qualify the predicted interaction and were dropped from the model for subsequent analysis. Of lesser theoretical interest for the present article was a Participant Gender x Target Gender interaction, F( 1,71 ) = 9.18, p < .01. Because this effect may be of interest for research on in-group versus out-group effects, it is reported here. Male participants were faster to respond to male targets than to female targets (Ms = 567 ms vs. 583 ms, respectively), whereas female participants responded nonsignificantly faster to female targets than to male targets (Ms = 525 ms vs. 529 ms, respectively).
the Prime Gender x Target Gender interaction was statistically significant, F(2, 144) = 15.28, p < .001.
Discussion
from Experiment 1 but with an even more highly constraining SOA of 250 ms; As noted earlier, greater constraints ought to reveal a stronger automatic effect, one that may include traits as well as nontraits.
Experiment 1 provided one of the first demonstrations of the automatic activation of gender stereotypes without perceivers' intention, under high cognitive constraints, and using RT as the indicator. Specifically, participants were faster to respond on gender stereotypic than counterstereotypic prime-target trials on a task that did not involve making conscious associations between the prime and the target and at a highly constraining 350-ms SOA. As in Banaji and Hardin's (in press) experiment, 70% of the participants in the present experiment reported awareness of the possibility that their responses were influenced by the gender association between the prime and the target. Although there were too few unaware participants to allow reliable statistical comparisons of the two groups, very similar patterns of data were observed for aware and unaware participants. This result suggests that intentions and cognitive constraints are distinct from awareness in producing stereotype priming effects (Bargh, 1989 (Bargh, , 1994 Kihlstrom, 1990) .
In an extension of previous research, stereotype priming was obtained with a highly representative stimulus set (64 attributes), producing an effect for both male and female stereotypes that were positive and negative. However, priming was much stronger for nontrait stereotypes than for trait stereotypes; indeed, the effect was not significant for personality-trait stereotypes. The strong effect for nontraits replicated Banaji and Hardin's (in press) finding of gender stereotype priming for roles and occupations, which were also nontraits. Moreover, there are several reasons to believe that nontrait attributes may be more strongly associated with social groups than are traits, and hence, may produce stronger automatic responding. For example, physical characteristics, such as skin color, body shape, hair length, and clothing, are primary means of categorizing people into social groups, such as race and gender (Brewer, 1988 ) . Personality traits may be inferred secondarily from these cues, or they may be used more when conscious judgments and justifications are made (cf. Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Jost & Banaji, 1994) . Indeed, Deaux and Lewis (1984) found that inferences about a target were more strongly determined by physical appearance information than by trait information, leading Deaux and Kite (1985) to propose that nontrait information may be more diagnostic because groups are more likely to share traits than nontraits." Some men are gentle and some women are aggressive, but few men wear skirts and few women are mechanics. Regardless of the exact mechanism underlying stronger priming for nontrait than trait stereotypic attributes, this finding highlights the importance of including nontrait attributes in an analysis of stereotyping, as advocated by several researchers but rarely followed in practice (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Deaux & Kite, 1985; Deaux & Lewis, 1984) .
Nevertheless, the null result for personality traits was not expected, and it seems unlikely that personality-trait stereotypes are not activated automatically. Hence, Experiment 2 was conducted to provide a replication of the stereotype priming effect, using the same positive and negative trait and nontrait stimuli Experiment 2
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to replicate the stereotype priming effect found in Experiment l and to provide evidence for the automatic activation of trait stereotypes as well as nontrait stereotypes.
Method Participants
Forty-five undergraduate students at Yale University ( 16 men and 29 women) participated for experimental credit in partial fulfillment of a course requirement.
Materials and Procedure
The materials and the procedure were identical to those used in Experiment l, except that the SOA was reduced to 250 ms. The experimental design was a 3 (prime gender: masculine vs. feminine vs. neutral) x 2 (target gender: male vs. female name) X 2 (prime type: trait vs. nontrait) 6 X 2 (prime valence: positive vs. negative) X 2 (participant gender: male vs. female) mixed design with all but participant gender operationalized as within-subjects variables.
Results
As in Experiment l, of primary interest was the speed with which participants responded to stereotypic prime-target trials versus counterstereotypic prime-target trials. Each participant completed 128 such trials, resulting in a total of 5,760 data points. Trials on which participants incorrectly classified the target name were eliminated (3% error rate). In addition, trials on which participants responded slower than three standard deviations from the mean were discarded (n = 84; 2% ofnonerror trials, distributed approximately equally across conditions). These procedures resulted in a final data set containing 5,488 observations across 45 participants. Finally, the data were log transformed before the statistical analysis was conducted.
On the basis of the results of Experiment l, we expected that stereotype priming would be revealed in Experiment 2 through participants' faster responses to stereotypic trials than to counterstereotypic trials. To test this prediction, we conducted a 2 (prime gender: masculine vs. feminine) x 2 (target gender: male vs. female) X 2 (prime type: trait vs. nontrait) X 2 (prime valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (participant gender: male vs. female) mixed factorial ANOVA on RTs (all variables except participant gender were repeated measures). 7 Replicating the results of Experiment 1, a statistically significant Prime Gender X Target Gender interaction provided evidence for the automatic activation of both male and female stereotypes, F( l, 44) = 27.66, p < .001 (Cohen's d = 1.12). As shown in Figure 2 , participants were (a) faster to respond to male targets following masculine primes than following feminine primes, t(44) = 5.00, p < .001; (b) faster to respond to male targets than to female targets following masculine primes, t(44) = 2.54, p < .05; (c) faster to respond to female targets following feminine primes than following masculine primes, t(44) = 3.05, p < .01; and (d) faster to respond to female targets than to male targets following feminine primes, t(44) = 3.21, p < .01. Hence, all four of the critical comparisons were significant.
These results replicate the stereotype priming effect obtained in Experiment 1, with a more highly constraining 250-ms SOA, providing additional evidence for the automatic manner in which stereotypes may be activated. Similar to Experiment 1, however, a three-way Prime Type × Prime Gender × Target Gender interaction, F( 1, 44) = 6.48, p < .05, revealed that the priming effect was stronger for nontrait stereotypes than personality-trait stereotypes. In contrast to Experiment 1, stereotype priming was evident for traits, F( 1, 44) = 3.51, p = .06, as well as nontraits, F( 1, 44) = 26.83, p < .001.
As in Experiment 1, a second analysis was conducted on RTs from trials with a nontrait prime to allow for appropriate comparisons including gender-neutral prime trials (see Table 2 ). These data were analyzed in a 3 (prime gender: masculine vs. feminine vs. neutral) × 2 (target gender: male vs. female) repeated measures ANOVA. Replicating Experiment 1, a significant two-way Prime Gender × Target Gender interaction, F(2, 88) = 16.16, p < .001, indicated that responses on gender-neutral prime trials were generally slower than responses on stereotypic trials but faster than responses on counterstereotypic trials. Note. Means with different subscripts differ significantly (p < .05). SOA = stimulus onset asynchrony.
Conclusions for E x p e r i m e n t s 1 and 2
Together, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 provide strong evidence for gender stereotype priming under baseline conditions. Specifically, both positive and negative personality trait (Experiment 2) and nontrait (Experiments 1 and 2) male and female stereotypes were shown to influence responses in a task that did not involve making conscious stereotypic associations and that occurred under highly constraining 250-ms and 350-ms SOAs. Moreover, this finding was obtained with a large, representative set of stimuli over a large number of judgments (i.e., 64 attributes and 128 judgments by each participant). Effect sizes of 0.62 and 1.12 for Experiments 1 and 2, respectively, show that the difference in automatic responding to stereotypic versus counterstereotypic events was of medium-to-large magnitude. As Cohen (1988) noted, effect sizes of this magnitude represent "grossly perceptible and therefore large differences" (p. 27). For example, the mean difference in height between 13-and 18-year-old women has an effect size of 0.80 (Cohen, 1988) .
Finally, the consistent finding of stronger stereotype priming with nontrait stereotypes than trait stereotypes highlights the important function that stereotypic physical attributes, objects, and social roles may play in social judgment (Deaux & Kite, 1985; Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Hoffman & Hurst, 1990) . However, the influence of personality stereotypes was not inconsequential in Experiment 2, suggesting that stereotype priming most likely involves both personality traits and nontraits. Additional research on this point may reveal conditions under which personality-trait versus nontrait stereotypes produce stronger automatic effects.
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated the utility of a semantic priming procedure to investigate the automatic activation of gender stereotypes. Furthermore, additional evidence was provided for the strong and ubiquitous manner in which stereotypes may be activated and influence response. We emphasize this finding here because the next two experiments were designed to reduce or eliminate the effect, necessarily changing the focus to conditions under which stereotype priming may not occur. 
E x p e r i m e n t 3
Experiments I and 2 revealed that stereotypes may be primed and influence responses when cognitive constraints are rela-tively severe and perceivers do not have a specific stereotype intention in place; in other words, automatic (stereotypic) processes may determine perceivers' responses under these conditions. In Experiments 3 and 4, we shifted our focus to the conditions under which perceivers may be able to overcome such an influence and moderate responses based on primed stereotypes.
Recent analyses of stereotyping have proposed that by effortfully processing nonstereotypic information, perceivers may be able to overcome automatic processes that facilitate stereotypic responses (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fiske, 1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Monteith, 1993) . Hence, one condition under which a stereotypic response may be moderated is perceivers' intention to process nonstereotypic information. In support of this hypothesis, Neuberg and Fiske (1987) demonstrated that participants could be motivated through outcome dependency to attend to a target's attributes instead of stereotypes associated with the target's social category, resulting in less stereotypic judgments. Similarly, Monteith found that participants motivated to be unprejudiced through a self-discrepancy manipulation rated stereotypic jokes about gay men less favorably than did participants not so motivated. Together, these results suggest that perceivers can implement intentions to overcome the influence ofstereotypic biases on judgment (but see Nelson, Biernat, & Manis, 1990) . However, because Neuberg and Fiske's and Monteith's research did not use procedures designed to assess the influence of automatic processes on stereotype activation or application, the role of perceiver intentions in moderating an automatic stereotypic response remains speculative. Indeed, when Neuberg and Fiske examined participants' nonverbal responses--a measure perhaps more indicative of automatic stereotype activation--outcome dependency did not moderate participants' responses: Participants demonstrated more negative nonverbal reactions to a schizophrenic target than to a nonstereotyped target.
To examine the role that intentions may have in moderating stereotype priming, perceivers must be given a strategy through which their intentions can be implemented. That is, because of the nature of automatic processes, it is not obvious how much effort perceivers should devote to a problem of an unknown magnitude or in what direction they should focus that energy (Bargh, 1992; . Previous research has suggested that increased attention to nonstereotypic information may decrease stereotypic responses (Monteith, 1993; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987) , allowing for the possibility that an intentional strategy that directs attention toward counterstereotypic information may moderate stereotype priming.
An Expectancy Strategy
Stereotypes are a specific type of expectancy (Hamilton, Sherman, & Ruvolo, 1990) , and like expectancies more generally, stereotypes may influence information processing by focusing attention on and facilitating the processing of information that is consistent with the stereotype (or inhibiting the processing of inconsistent information; Becker, 1980; Bruner, 1957; Olson, Roese, Zanna, 1996; cf. Gollwitzer, 1993) . Not surprisingly, stereotypes have been shown to facilitate the perception, encoding, retrieval, and interpretation of stereotypic information (for reviews, see Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Hamilton et al., 1990) . Although most of this research has examined how expectancies operate to confirm stereotypes, it is reasonable to suppose that counterstereotype expectancies may operate to disconfirm the stereotype by facilitating the processing of counterstereotypic information.
In Experiment 3, we examined the effectiveness of intentional strategies in moderating stereotype priming by manipulating participants' strategy to expect either stereotypes or counterstereotypes. If stereotype priming can be moderated by participants' intentions, participants with a counterstereotype strategy ought to demonstrate significantly lower levels of stereotype priming as compared with participants with the opposite stereotype strategy.
Cognitive Resources in the Moderation of Stereotype Priming
One variable that may affect the success of intentional strategies in moderating stereotype priming is the availability of cognitive resources, often operationalized by the level of task (cognitive) constraints (e.g., the amount of time available for the task or the complexity of the task). This variable is quite familiar to social cognition researchers, and indeed, a number of studies have shown that stereotypes are more likely to operate when cognitive constraints are high (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1990; Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991, Study 2; Jamieson & Zanna, 1989; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Pratto & Bargh, 1991; Rothbart, Evans, & Fulero, 1979) . This research has suggested that perceivers' intentional strategies to avoid stereotypes may fail under high cognitive constraints. Such an interpretation is consistent with many theories of automaticity in which cognitive constraints play a critical role in distinguishing between automatic and controlled processes. Specifically, automatic processes are believed to require fewer cognitive resources than controlled processes, with the consequence that automatic processes (e.g., stereotype activation) are likely to determine response under high cognitive constraints (Neely, 1977; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) . However, little research has examined the role of cognitive constraints in stereotype priming with procedures established to reveal the operation of automatic as well as controlled processes.
An exception is provided by Gilbert and Hixon ( 1991, Study 1 ) . In their study, participants who were cognitively busy during exposure to a stereotyped group member (an Asian assistant) were less likely to provide stereotypic word completions on a subsequent implicit (automatic) stereotype measure than were participants who had not been cognitively busy during the exposure phase. Gilbert and Hixon interpreted this result as evidence that cognitive constraints may prevent the activation of stereotypes and thereby their subsequent implicit use. However, that research did not address whether cognitive constraints affect the success of an intentional strategy to counter stereotype priming, the focus of the present experiment.
The present priming procedure easily lends itself to an examination of the moderating role of cognitive constraints in stereotype priming. That is, inherent in the semantic priming proce-dure adapted here is the ability to vary the time participants are given to engage, focus, and commit attention to the prime before the onset of the target (i.e., the SOA). Manipulating the amount of time provided for a task is also a conventional method of manipulating constraints on cognitive resources (e.g., Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Pratto & Bargh, 1991) . Hence, cognitive constraints were manipulated in Experiment 3 by varying the SOA. Specifically, participants performed half of the priming trials at a 2,000-ms SOA (low cognitive constraint) and half of the priming trials at a 350-ms SOA ( high cognitive constraint). On the basis of previous research (e.g., Neely, 1977) , we expected that participants' intentional strategy to counter stereotype priming would be significantly more effective at a 2,000-ms SOA than at a 350-ms SOA.
Overview and Hypotheses
Before completing a priming task similar to that used in the previous two experiments, participants in Experiment 3 were motivated to use an intentional strategy to expect stereotypes or to expect counterstereotypes during the prime-target trials. Cognitive constraints were manipulated through changes in the SOA during the task (350 ms vs. 2,000 ms). We predicted that the influence of participants' intentional strategy on stereotype priming would interact with constraints on their cognitive resources as follows:
1. At a 2,000-ms SOA, participants ought to have sutficient cognitive resources to be able to implement their intentions. Participants with a stereotype strategy were predicted to produce evidence of stereotype priming, whereas participants with a counterstereotype strategy were predicted to produce an opposite pattern of response, the complete reversal of stereotype priming (i.e., a counterstereotypic pattern of response).
2. At a 350-ms SOA, however, participants' ability to implement their intentional strategy ought to be highly constrained. Participants with a stereotype strategy were predicted to produce evidence of stereotype priming because automatic processes would produce such an outcome even if participants' intentional strategy failed. The predicted outcome for participants with a counterstereotype strategy, however, was less clear. If stereotype priming cannot be controlled under the high cognitive constraints imposed by a 350-ms SOA, then a stereotype priming effect will be obtained despite participants' intentionto the contrary. However, if participants can moderate stereotype priming under such constraints, then participants with a counterstereotype strategy ought to produce significantly lower levels of stereotype priming than participants with a stereotype strategy.
was strengthened more than the other. Second, all participants performed the same task in Experiment 1, equalizing across conditions any carryover effects from Experiment 1 to Experiment 3. It may be argued that participants' motivation to avoid stereotypes was heightened as a result of participating in Experiment 1 (cf. Monteith, 1993) , especially since many of the participants were aware that gender may have influenced their responses. Such a possibility, however, should only decrease differences between the critical experimental conditions. For example, participants highly motivated to counter stereotypes ought to be less effective in carrying out the stereotype expectancy strategy, reducing differences between this and the counterstereotype condition.
Materials and Procedure
The materials and the procedure were identical to those used in Experiments I and 2, with the following exceptions: (a) Before the priming task, participants were randomly assigned to either the stereotype or the counterstereotype expectancy strategy condition (described below); (b) participants completed one block of trials at a 350-ms SOA and the other block of trials at a 2,000-ms SOA (block order was counterbalanced across participants); and (c) although all primes and targets appeared in both blocks (350-ms and 2,000-ms SOAs), because of the different ratio of stereotypic to counterstereotypic trials (explained below), some of the primes were paired with the same gender target in both blocks (e.g., dependent-Jane and dependent-Mary, hostile-Sarah and hostile-Carol).
Stereotype strategy. Participants in this condition were told that if the first word was stereotypically masculine (e.g., ambitious), they should expect the target to be a male name (e.g., Brian), and if the first word was stereotypically feminine (e.g., perfume), they should expect the target to be a female name (e.g., Betty). Because controlled strategies depend on perceivers' motivation to engage in them, participants in this experiment were motivated to maintain their intentional strategy by information regarding the instrumentality of the strategy for their task. That is, participants were told that most of the time the first word and the target name would match in their gender association, hence, expecting stereotypes would help participants predict upcoming events and improve their performance (their speed and accuracy at judging name gender). Indeed, these participants received a 5:3 ratio of stereotypic to counterstereotypic trials. 8 Practice and buffer trials were composed of the same stereotypic to counterstereotypic ratio as in the experimental trials, and gender-neutral primes (one third of all trials) were paired equally often with male and female targets.
Counterstereotype strategy. Participants in this condition were told that if the first word was stereotypically masculine (e.g., ambitious), they should expect the target to be a female name (e.g., Betty), and if the first word was stereotypically feminine (e.g., perfume ), they should expect the target to be a male name (e.g., Brian). Parallel to the stereotype strategy condition, participants were motivated to maintain a counterstereotype intention by the information that most of the time the first word and the target name would be the opposite in their gender association, hence, expecting counterstereotypes would improve performance. (See Appendix C for detailed instructions given to participants.)
Method Participants
Seventy-three undergraduate students at Yale University (27 men and 46 women) from Experiment 1 participated in Experiment 3 after a 5-min break, during which they were occupied by playing a nonverbal water game. There are several reasons why their earlier participation in Experiment 1 was unlikely to significantly affect the results of Experiment 3. First, in Experiment 1 participants were exposed equally to gender stereotypic and counterstereotypic associations so that neither s Participants were motivated to use a particular intentional strategy by associating it with task effectiveness instead of by associating it with the benefits or drawbacks of gender stereotyping per se (cf. Nelson et al., 1990; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987) . This procedure was chosen because we believed that college students could be easily motivated to use an intentional strategy to enhance their performance on a cognitive task. However, experiments that examine the effectiveness of manipulating different underlying motivations (e.g., the desire to improve task performance vs. the desire to be nonprejudiced) would be of theoretical and practical interest. Accordingly, participants in this condition received a 3:5 ratio of stereotypic to counterstereotypic trials. Practice and buffer trials were composed of the same stereotypic to counterstereotypic ratio as in the experimental trials, and gender-neutral primes (one third of all trials) were paired equally often with male and female targets.
The experimental design was a 2 (SOA: 350 ms vs. 2,000 ms) X 2 (strategy: stereotype vs. counterstereotype) X 3 (prime gender: masculine vs. feminine vs. neutral) X 2 (target gender: male vs. female) X 2 (prime type: trait vs. nontrait) 9 x 2 (prime valence: positive vs. negative) X 2 (participant gender: male vs. female) mixed design with all variables manipulated within subjects except for strategy and participant gender, which were between-subjects variables.
Results
Data from 3 male participants were discarded because of a disproportionate number of errors resulted in missing data in at least one cell. All analyses were conducted on data from the remaining 70 participants. As in the previous experiments, an analysis was first conducted on the data from stereotypic and counterstereotypic prime-target trials. Each of the 70 participants completed 128 such trials, resulting in a total of 8,960 data points. Trials on which participants incorrectly classified the target name were eliminated (9% error rate overall: for the stereotype strategy condition, 8% at 2,000-ms SOA and 11% at 350-ms SOA; for the counterstereotype strategy condition, 9% at 2,000-ms SOA and 8% at 350-ms SOA) as were trials on which the RT was higher than three standard deviations above the mean (n = 72; 1% of nonerror trials, distributed approximately equally across conditions). These procedures resulted in a final data set of 8,059 observations across 70 participants. Finally, the data were log transformed before the statistical analysis was conducted.
The question of primary interest in Experiment 3 was whether participants' intentional strategy would interact with constraints on cognitive resources to moderate stereotype priming. To address this question, we conducted a 2 (SOA: 350 ms vs. 2,000 ms) X 2 (strategy: stereotype vs. counterstereotype) X 2 (prime gender: masculine vs. feminine) x 2 (target gender: male vs. female) x 2 (prime type: trait vs. nontrait) x 2 (prime valence: positive vs. negative) X 2 (participant gender: male vs. female) mixed factorial ANOVA on RTs, with all variables except participant gender and strategy as repeated measures, l° The predicted four-way interaction of SOA, strategy, prime gender, and target gender was significant, F( l, 68) = 10.48, p < .01. To examine this result in more detail, the three-way Strategy x Prime Gender X Target Gender interaction is presented separately for each SOA condition in Figures 3 and 4 .
Strategy Effectiveness Under Low Cognitive Constraints
The strong gender stereotype priming produced by participants using a stereotype strategy, F( l, 34) = I 1.84, p < .01 9 Except for gender-neutral primes, which were all nontraits. ~0 Participant gender, prime valence, and prime type were not involved in any of the predicted interactions and were dropped from the model for subsequent analysis. (Cohen's d = 0.82), and the complete reversal of gender stereotype priming produced by participants using a counterstereotype strategy, F( 1, 34) = 30.53, p < .001 (Cohen's d = 1.32), demonstrated the ease with which participants were able to implement their intentions under relatively low cognitive constraints (see Figure 3) . Accordingly, the three-way Strategy x Prime Gender × Target Gender interaction was significant in that condition, F( 1,68 ) = 35.21, p < .001. Furthermore, planned t tests revealed that participants with the stereotype strategy were (a) faster to respond to male targets following masculine primes than following feminine primes, t (34) = 3.11, p < .01; (b) faster to respond to male targets than to female targets following masculine primes, t(34) = 3.72, p < .001; (c) faster to respond to female targets following feminine primes than following masculine primes, t(34) = 3.62, p < .001; and (d) faster to respond to female targets than to male targets following feminine primes, t(34) = 3.03, p < .01. In contrast, planned t tests revealed that participants with the counterstereotype strategy were (a) faster to respond to female targets following masculine primes than following feminine primes, t(34) = 5.78, p < .001; (b) faster to respond to female targets than to male targets following masculine primes, t(34) = 5.75, p < .001; (c) faster to respond to male targets following feminine primes than following masculine primes, t(34) = 4.76, p < .001; and (d) faster to respond to male targets than to female targets following feminine primes, t(34) = 4.47, p < .001. Figure 4 , however, tells a different story. Under relatively high cognitive constraints (350-ms SOA), participants with a stereotype strategy continued to produce a stereotypic pattern of response, F( l, 34) = 17.84, p < .001 (Cohen's d = 1.04), and the three-way SOA × Prime Gender × Target Gender interaction was far from significant for these participants, F( 1, 34) = 0.04. Planned t tests revealed that these participants were (a) faster to respond to male targets following masculine primes than following feminine primes, t(34) = 3.75, p < .001; (b) faster to respond to male targets than to female targets following masculine primes, t(34) = 2.58, p < .05; (c) faster to respond to female targets following feminine primes than following masculine primes, t(34) = 3.25, p < .01; and (d) faster to respond to female targets than to male targets following feminine primes, t(34) = 3.92,p < .001.
Strategy Effectiveness Under High Cognitive Constraints
In contrast, participants with a counterstereotype strategy failed to reverse stereotype priming as they had done at a 2,000-ms SOA. Accordingly, the three-way SOA × Prime Gender × Target Gender interaction was significant in this condition, F( 1, 34) = 34.25, p < .001. In fact, the pattern of data produced at a 350-ms SOA showed a tendency toward stereotypic responses, despite participants' intention to the contrary. However, the Prime Gender × Target Gender interaction was far from significant, F( l, 34) = 1.61 (Cohen's d = 0.33) , revealing that participants' responses in this condition were not entirely due to automatic (stereotypic) processes. Furthermore, planned t tests showed that RTs were statistically similar across the Prime Gender X Target Gender categories, with the exception that responses to female targets were significantly faster following feminine primes than following masculine primes, t(34) = 2.07, p < .05.
As additional evidence that participants were able to moderate stereotype priming even under the high cognitive constraints im-posed by a 350-ms SOA, a significant three-way Strategy x Prime Gender X Target Gender interaction was obtained in this condition, F( 1, 68) = 10.43, p < .01. Figure 4 shows that at a 350-ms SOA, participants with a counterstereotype strategy produced significantly less stereotype priming than did participants with the opposite stereotype strategy.
Of some interest was an unpredicted interaction between strategy and SOA, F(1,68) = 6.52, p < .05. This interaction indicated that participants in the counterstereotype condition were slower at a 350-ms SOA (M = 528 ms) than at a 2,000-ms SOA (M = 464 ms) and also slower than participants in the stereotype condition at a 350-ms SOA (M = 465 ms) and at a 2,000-ms SOA (M = 470 ms). These data suggest that implementing a counterstereotype strategy at a 350-ms SOA may have been quite difficult, resulting in slower responses, j~
The results of Experiment 3 demonstrate the influence that intentional strategies may have on stereotype priming, and they underscore the important role that cognitive constraints play in determining the extent of that influence. Under low cognitive constraints, participants were able to completely override the influence of automatic processes on their response, producing opposite patterns of data consistent with their different intentional strategies (i.e., stereotyping vs. counterstereotyping). In contrast, participants' responses began to show the influence of automatic (stereotypic) processes under high cognitive constraints. However, even under such constraints, participants with a counterstereotype strategy produced significantly lower levels of priming than did participants with a stereotype strategy, indicating that they were able to moderate their response to a considerable degree in this condition. This last result appears to challenge conventional notions of automaticity and is discussed in more detail below.
Gender-Neutral Prime Trials
As in Experiments 1 and 2, a second analysis was conducted in Experiment 3 to examine the data from gender-neutral prime Note. Within each strategy and stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) condition, means with different subscripts differ significantly (17 < .05).
trials (see Table 3 ). To allow for appropriate comparisons, only RTs from trials with a nontrait prime were used. Within each of the cognitive constraint (SOA) conditions, we conducted a 2 (strategy: stereotype vs. counterstereotype) X 3 (prime gender: masculine vs. feminine vs. neutral) X 2 (target gender: male vs. female) mixed model ANOVA on RTs. Looking first at the 2,000-ms SOA condition, a significant three-way Strategy X Prime Gender X Target Gender interaction was obtained, F(2, 136) = 19.90, p < .001. The pattern of means showed that for participants with a stereotype strategy, responses on genderneutral prime trials were similar to those on counterstereotypic trials (unexpected), and participants were faster on stereotypic prime trials (expected) than on gender-neutral prime trials, F(2, 68) = 4.84, p < .05. The parallel pattern was obtained from participants with a counterstereotype strategy: Responses on gender-neutral prime trials were similar to responses on stereotypic trials (unexpected), whereas responses were faster on counterstereotypic trials (expected) than on gender-neutral prime trials: Prime Gender X Target Gender interaction, F(2, 68) = 19.78,p < .001. A significant three-way Strategy X Prime Gender X Target Gender interaction was also obtained in the 350-ms SOA condition, F(2, 136) = 10.04, p < .001. However, the pattern of means was different from that obtained in the 2,000-ms SOA condition. Specifically, the means in the stereotype strategy condition resembled those obtained in Experiments l and 2, with generally faster responses on stereotypic trials and slower responses on counterstereotypic trials as compared with responses on gender-neutral prime trials: Prime Gender X Target Gender interaction, F(2, 68) = 21.24, p < .001. In contrast, responses in the counterstereotype strategy condition on genderneutral prime trials were not significantly different from those on stereotypic and counterstereotypic trials. However, the Prime Gender X Target Gender interaction was significant, F(2, 68) --3.43, p < .05. This finding is consistent with the idea that nontraits may be more strongly associated with gender than are traits, and hence, their automatic influence on response is more difficult to avoid.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 3 suggest that both perceiver intentions and constraints on cognitive resources may play a sig-H Two additional significant lower order interactions were obtained. Because these effects are of lesser interest, we present them here. A significant overall Prime Gender X Target Gender interaction, F( 1, 68 ) = 35.50, p < .001, indicated that because in only one of the four experimental conditions was stereotyping reversed (as expected), collapsing across experimental conditions produced overall faster responding to stereotypic prime-target trials (Mremale:femate = 467 ms and Mmale:male = 465 ms) than to counterstereotypic prime-target trials (Mfemate:mal e = 497 ms and Mma~,:f~ma~e = 497 ms). In addition, a significant three-way Prime Gender x Target Gender X Strategy interaction, F( 1, 68) = 39.09, p < .001, indicated that participants who expected stereotypes were overall faster to respond to stereotypic prime-target trials than to counterstereotypic prime-target trials (Mferaale:female = 440 ms and Mmale:~al~ = 437 ms vs. Mremle:m~e = 531 ms and M~l¢:fer,~ = 528 ms), whereas participants who expected counterstereotypes were overall faster to respond to counterstereotypic prime-target trials than to stereotypic prime-target trials (MfCm~:m~e = 480 ms and M~e:r,~a~e = 481 ms vs. Mf~male:r~le = 523 ms and M~l~:~,~l~ = 521 ms). nificant role in moderating the influence of automatic processes on response to either reveal or counter the activation of stereotypes. Specifically, the interaction of these two variables produced three patterns of data: (a) strong stereotype priming, (b) moderated stereotype priming, and (c) complete reversal of stereotype priming.
As expected, under relatively low cognitive constraints (2,000-ms SOA), participants with a stereotype strategy produced strong stereotype priming, and participants with a counterstereotype strategy produced a complete reversal of stereotype priming. These two patterns of data suggest that perceivers can eliminate stereotypic responses with an intentional strategy and when cognitive constraints are relatively low. This result is consistent with current theories of the conditions under which controlled processes can override automatic processes to determine the outcome (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Neely, 1977; Posner & Snyder, 1975 ) . The complete reversal of stereotypic responses is particularly significant in its suggestion of the malleability of priming effects and the strength of intentional processes. That is, the automatic operation of semantic and stereotypic associations is generally believed to be based on long-term learning and, hence, is relatively insensitive to minimal interventions. However, in this experiment, we demonstrated that participants with a counterstereotype strategy and with 2 s on each trial to implement that strategy were able to completely reverse the basic automatic stereotype priming effect.
Of greater interest, however, are the results produced by participants under relatively high cognitive constraints. Most impressive is the finding that even under such constraints, participants with an intentional counterstereotype strategy were able to moderate stereotype priming. That is, although a stereotypic pattern of response began to appear at a 350-ms SOA despite participants' intention to the contrary, that influence was small (d = 0.33) and not statistically significant. Moreover, these participants produced a significantly lower level of stereotypic responses at a 350-ms SOA than did participants with the opposite stereotype strategy. These results are surprising in consideration of the majority of automaticity theories, which hold that controlled processes ought to fail under high cognitive constraints whereas automatic processes (stereotype activation) ought to be revealed under such conditions (e.g., Neely, 1977; Posner & Snyder, 1975 ; see also Kihlstrom, 1990) . Furthermore, previous research has indicated that an SOA of less than 500 ms sufficiently constrains cognitive resources to reveal an automatic process (Banaji & Hardin, in press; Bargh et al., 1992; Fazio et al., 1986; Neely, 1977 ) . In light of current theory and research, the results of Experiment 3 raise at least two questions: (a) Was stereotype priming eliminated by an intentional strategy at a 350-ms SOA, and (b) how can the present findings be reconciled with previous research that has shown the dominance of automatic processes under similar cognitive constraints?
Was Stereotype Priming Eliminated at a 350-ms SOA?
This first question may be raised because even though the Prime Gender × Target Gender interaction was not significant at a 350-ms SOA, the stereotypic pattern of data and an effect size of 0.33, albeit small, suggest that stereotypes really did dominate in that condition despite participants' intentional strategy. Perhaps significant priming would be revealed with a few more participants. A power analysis, however, showed that approximately eight times as many participants would be required to obtain the strong priming effects found in our other conditions. Nonetheless, we concur with others that the level or measure of significance at which an effect can be said to have or have not occurred is arbitrary in many respects (Cohen, 1994) . Moreover, the importance of the present experiment does not rest on whether priming was completely eliminated or not at a 350-ms SOA. The significance of these results lies in the finding that stereotype priming was significantly moderated by participants' intentional strategy even under relatively high cognitive constraints. At a 350-ms SOA, participants with a counterstereotype strategy produced a pattern of data that was significantly different from that produced by participants with the opposite stereotype strategy. This result clearly demonstrates that perceiver intentions can influence the processes involved in priming under the cognitive constraints imposed here.
What Is an Automatic Effect?
The question remains, then, of how to reconcile the present findings with previous research. The experiment that provides the closest comparison to the present data was conducted by Neely (1977) . In that experiment, Neely showed that participants were able to implement a controlled strategy to expect semantically unrelated words (similar to our counterstereotype expectancy strategy) under relatively low cognitive constraints but were unable to do so under relatively high cognitive constraints (i.e., less than 500-ms SOA). Instead, at short SOAs, there was no significant difference between responses based on an inconsistent semantic expectancy and responses based on a consistent semantic expectancy: All participants were faster to respond on semantically related trials than on semantically unrelated trials. As noted earlier, this influential finding led to the use of an SOA cutoff of 500 ms or less as the defining criterion for revealing an automatic process.
On the surface, it appears that the present results directly challenge Neely's (1977) findings and question the nature of automatic processes. Should the conclusion from Experiment 3 be that current notions of automaticity must change? We believe that the answer is no, and the discrepancy in results from the two experiments may be resolved by taking a closer look at the phenomena studied and the procedures used by each. Such an examination reveals at least three potentially significant differences.
First, in his counter-expectancy condition, Neely (1977) instructed participants to expect that building parts (e.g., shingles, door) would follow the prime body and that body parts (e.g., heart, legs) would follow the prime building. In this manner, participants were attempting to follow an expectancy strategy for two semantically unrelated categories. In contrast, participants in the present experiment's counter-expectancy condition were instructed to expect that male names would follow feminine primes and female names would follow masculine primes. Aside from differences in the category level of the prime (i.e., a category label vs. category exemplars), the argument could be made that buildings and bodies are much less likely and much less frequently considered as a pair than are the pairing of masculine and feminine attributes with counter-stereotypic female and male names, particularly since greater public access to feminist thinking has encouraged men and women to consider the virtues of nonstereotypic thinking as well as nonstereotypic activities, roles, and occupations. In addition, it is possible that even though the social desirability of avoiding stereotypes was not emphasized in the present experiment, participants may have been more motivated to avoid stereotypic associations than participants attempting to avoid normatively neutral, nonsocial semantic associations in Neely's experiment. Thus, a counterstereotype strategy may have been easier to follow, and participants may have been more motivated to maintain the strategy as compared with a counter-expectancy strategy to avoid nonsocial semantic associations. Future research directly comparing differences in familiarity with counterexpectancy strategies and differences in motivation to implement them may shed light on this issue.
Second, the tasks in our experiment and Neely's (1977) experiment appear to differ in complexity. That is, participants in Neely's experiment were instructed to carry out both a consistent semantic expectancy and an inconsistent semantic expectancy at the same time (i.e., expectancy strategy was a withinsubjects manipulation). In addition to expecting a crossed association of body parts with building and building parts with body (inconsistent expectancy), on trials in which the prime was bird, participants were supposed to expect a type of bird as the target (consistent expectancy). In contrast, participants in the present experiment were required to carry out only one strategy on all trials, either a stereotype expectancy or a counterstereotype expectancy. It should be arguably easier to implement one type of expectancy on all trials than to implement two very different expectancies on randomly occurring trials. Indeed, at least one study has shown that people may have difficulty dynamically adjusting their response criteria (Strayer & Kramer, 1994) .
Finally, an argument could be made that although a 350-ms SOA is below the conventionally accepted cutoff of 500 ms, it may not be enough of a constraint for the strongest test of perceivers' ability to intentionally counter stereotype priming. Indeed, controlled processes appeared to be stronger in Neely's (1977) experiment at a 400-ms SOA--a condition close to the present 350-ms SOA--than at a 250-ms SOA. As noted earlier, it is the task constraints imposed by short SOAs that have received the most attention in defining an automatic effect. A stronger test of the strength of intentional strategies in countering stereotype priming would thus be provided with a 250-ms SOA.
Experiment 4
The purpose of Experiment 4 was to provide a test of the effectiveness of intentional strategies in countering stereotype priming under even greater cognitive constraints than those used in Experiment 3. Hence, the participants in Experiment 4 received the same instructions and priming procedure as the participants in the counterstereotype strategy condition of Experiment 3, except that cognitive constraints in the high constraint condition were reduced to a 250-ms SOA (the SOA in the low constraint condition remained at 2,000 ms).
We predicted that participants' intentional strategy would interact with constraints on their cognitive resources to moderate stereotype priming, such that participants' counterstereotype strategy would produce lower levels of priming under low cognitive constraints than under high cognitive constraints. Specifically, participants were expected to produce a reversal of stereotype priming under low but not high cognitive constraints, a replication of Experiment 3. The pattern of response under high cognitive constraints was less predictable. On the basis of current standards of automaticity, participants should not be able to keep automatic processes from producing significant gender stereotype priming at a 250-ms SOA. However, the results of Experiment 3 suggest that participants may be able to alter such priming even under the constraints imposed by a 250-ms SOA.
Method Participants
Forty-five undergraduate students at Yale University ( 16 men and 29 women) from Experiment 2 participated in Experiment 4 after a 5-min break, during which they were occupied by playing a nonverbal water game.
Materials and Procedure
The materials and the procedure were identical to those used in the counterstereotype strategy condition in Experiment 3 (i.e., all participants received the counterstereotype strategy instructions), except that half of the trials were presented at a 250-ms SOA and the other half were presented at a 2,000-ms SOA. The experimental design was a 2 (SOA: 250 ms vs. 2,000 ms) × 3 (prime gender: masculine vs. feminine vs. neutral) × 2 (target gender: male vs. female) × 2 (prime type: trait vs. nontrait) ~2 X 2 (prime valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (participant gender: male vs. female) mixed design with all variables manipulated within subjects except for participant gender.
Results
Data from 1 male and 1 female participant were discarded because a disproportionate number of errors resulted in missing data in at least one cell. All subsequent analyses were conducted on data from the remaining 43 participants. The first analysis was conducted on data from stereotypic and counterstereotypic trials. Each of the 43 participants completed 128 such trials, resulting in a total of 5,504 data points. Trials on which participants incorrectly classified the target name were eliminated (8% error rate for both 2,000-ms and 250-ms SOAs) as were trials on which the RT was higher than three standard deviations above the mean (n = 55; 1% of nonerror trials, distributed approximately equally across conditions). These procedures resulted in a final data set of 5,016 observations across 43 participants. The data were log transformed before the statistical analysis was conducted.
To examine the effectiveness of a counterstereotype strategy at both 250-ms and 2,000-ms SOAs, we conducted a 2 (SOA:
t2 Except for gender-neutral primes, which were all nontraits. 250 ms vs. 2,000 ms) x 2 (prime gender: masculine vs. feminine) X 2 (target gender: male vs. female) X 2 (prime type: trait vs. nontrait) x 2 (prime valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (participant gender: male vs. female) mixed model ANOVA on RTs. ~3 Replicating the results of Experiment 3, a significant three-way SOA X Prime Gender X Target Gender interaction, F( l, 42) = 39.48, p < .00 l, revealed that participants' intentional strategy was much more effective under low cognitive constraints than under high cognitive constraints. Figure 5 shows that, as predicted, participants completely reversed stereotype priming under low cognitive constraints, F ( l, 42) = 30.69, p < .001 (Cohen's d = 1.22) . Planned t tests revealed that in this condition, participants using the counterstereotype strategy produced (a) faster responding to female targets following masculine primes than following feminine primes, t(42) = 6.69, p < .001; (b) faster responding to female targets than to male targets following masculine primes, t(42) = 4.63, p < .001; (c) faster responding to male targets following feminine primes than following masculine primes, t(42) = 4.09, p < .001; and (d) faster responding to male targets than to female targets following feminine primes, t(42 ) = 4.40, p < .001.
In contrast, the cognitive constraints imposed by a 250-ms SOA did not allow participants to reverse stereotype priming and revealed instead a slight tendency toward priming. Similar to the results of Experiment 3, however, this pattern was far from significant, F ( l , 42) = 0.11 (Cohen's d = 0.10) , and planned t tests showed that at a 250-ms SOA, participants' response times were not significantly different across the Prime Gender X Target Gender categories. These results replicate those of Experiment 3 and suggest that even at a 250-ms SOA, perceivers may be able to significantly moderate gender stereotype priming. Finally, a main effect of SOA, F ( l, 42) = 16.37, p < .00 l, indicated that participants may have slowed their responding in attempts to implement the counterstereotype strategy at a 250-ms SOA ( M = 569 ms for 250-ms SOA and M = 502 for 2,000-ms SOA)/4
A second analysis was conducted on RTs from nontrait prime trials to allow for appropriate comparisons with gender-neutral ~3 Participant gender, prime valence, and prime type were not involved in any of the predicted interactions and were dropped from the model for subsequent analysis. However, a Participant Gender x Target Gender interaction was obtained and is reported here because this effect may be of interest for research on in-group versus out-group effects. This interaction indicated that female participants were faster to respond to female targets than to male targets (Ms = 537 ms vs. 550 ms, respectively), whereas male participants were faster to respond to male targets than to female targets (Ms = 507 ms vs. 527 ms, respectively), F(1,41) = 4.81,p < .05.
~4 An overall Prime Gender x Target Gender interaction, F( l, 42 ) = 17.1 l, p < .00 l, was also obtained, which indicates that participants were faster overall to respond to counterstereotypic prime-target trials than to stereotypic prime-target trials (Mfemale:male = 517 ms and primes (see Table 4 ). A 2 (SOA: 250 ms vs. 2,000 ms) × 3 (prime gender: masculine vs. feminine vs. neutral) × 2 (target gender: male vs. female) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant full three-way interaction, F(2, 84) = 16.64, p < .001. Similar to the results of Experiment 3, at a 2,000-ms SOA, responses on gender-neutral prime trials were not significantly different from responses on stereotypic trials (unexpected), whereas responses on counterstereotypic trials (expected) were significantly faster than responses on gender-neutral prime trials: Prime Gender × Target Gender interaction, F(2, 84) = 23.70, p < .001. At a 250-ms SOA, however, participants' responses on gender-neutral prime trials were not significantly different from their responses on either stereotypic or counterstereotypic trials, and in contrast to Experiment 3, the Prime Gender × Target Gender interaction was far from significant, F(2, 84) = 0.08.
Conclusions for Experiments 3 and 4
Together, Experiments 3 and 4 provide support for the roles of perceiver intentions and cognitive constraints in moderating stereotype priming. Consistent with current theories of automaticity (e.g., Bargh, 1989; Neely, 1977; Posner & Snyder, 1975) , both experiments demonstrated that the success of an intentional strategy to counter stereotype priming depends critically on the degree to which cognitive resources are constrained: Participants were able to completely reverse priming at a 2,000-ms SOA but not at 250-ms or 350-ms SOAs. This result provides strong support for the resource-consuming nature of intentional strategies in controlling the effects of an automatic process.
Notwithstanding the importance of cognitive constraints in determining perceivers' ability to control their response, the resuits of Experiments 3 and 4 highlight the potential strength of perceiver intentions to counter stereotype priming. Even under relatively high cognitive constraints (350-ms SOA), participants with an intentional counterstereotype strategy produced significantly lower levels of priming than did participants with the opposite stereotype strategy. Moreover, the counterstereotype strategy reduced the priming effect to statistical insignificance for trait stereotypes at a 350-ms SOA and for both trait and nontrait stereotypes at a 250-ms SOA. Without a counterstereotype intention (Experiments l and 2), gender stereotype Note. Within each stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) condition, means with different subscripts differ significantly (p < .05).
priming was of medium-to-large magnitude (ds = 0.65 and 1.10 for Experiments 1 and 2, respectively), whereas with such an intention in place (Experiments 3 and 4), gender stereotype priming was considerably smaller (ds = 0.33 and 0.10 for Experiments 3 and 4, respectively). These results are powerful in their support for the controllability of stereotype priming. However, they also suggest that alone, the current SOA standard for defining an automatic response may be too simplistic. Earlier we described Neely's ( 1977 ) experiment showing that at short SOAs (less than 500 ms), responses were determined by (automatic) semantic associations despite participants' intentional strategy. This finding has been used in subsequent research to define an automatic process as one that operates at an SOA below that cutoff. The present research, however, showed that an intentional strategy can influence responses even at a 250-ms SOA. This finding is significant in pointing to the role that other task components may play in revealing an automatic versus a controlled process (cf. Bargh, 1994; Kihlstrom, 1990) . For example, the complexity of the task, the strength of the underlying association, the perceiver's intention, the effectiveness of a particular strategy, and the pereeiver's motivation to maintain the strategy may determine the automaticity of a response, as well as the time constraints under which the perceiver is operating. Thus, we do not see our findings as contradicting previous research but rather as having tested an automatic process under differing task parameters. One conclusion to be drawn from the present research is that SOA in conjunction with other aspects of the task ought to be used in determining where on the continuum of automaticity a particular effect lies.
By examining the opposition that can be exerted against stereotype priming under highly constraining conditions, the techniques employed in the present research are useful for investigating the mechanisms by which perceivers control the influence of automatic processes when resources are scarce. At least several explanations for the present data may be advanced.
First, it is important to rule out the possibility that stereotype priming was moderated under high constraints because participants stopped doing the task (i.e., responses were more or less random). An examination of the error-rate data supported the operation of a strategic mechanism. That is, the reduction in stereotype priming, as assessed by changes in RTs, was not obtained by sacrificing accuracy. The accuracy data generally followed the pattern of RTs, indicating that there was no accuracyspeed trade-off. Moreover, participants in the counterstereotype condition did not make more errors than participants in the stereotype condition at a 350-ms SOA in Experiment 3 (8% vs. 11%, respectively) nor did they make more errors under high cognitive constraints than low cognitive constraints in either Experiment 3 or Experiment 4 (8% vs. 9% and 8% vs. 8%, respectively).
Assuming that the counterstereotype strategy produced systematic responding under high cognitive constraints, several explanatory mechanisms are possible: (a) Participants learned to oppose stereotype priming over trials, (b) participants engaged in a trial-by-trial effortful strategy to oppose stereotype priming, and (c) participants activated a counterstereotype schema that competed with automatically activated stereotypes to influence the response. We discuss each of these explanations in turn.
As noted earlier, previous research has suggested that automatic processes cannot be strategically controlled under high cognitive constraints. If this is indeed the case, stereotype priming may have been moderated in the present research because the counterstereotype strategy was itself automatized. That is, over time, goals (intentions) and behavior may be habitualized and operate in an automatic manner, that is, without attentional resources ( Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994) .
The possibility that the counterstereotype strategy was automatized and thus more effective over trials can be addressed most sensitively by correlations between trial number and RTs on stereotypic and counterstereotypic trials. That is, learning to oppose stereotype priming would be revealed by a positive correlation between trial number and RTs on stereotypic trials (i.e., responses on stereotypic trials became slower over time), a negative correlation between trial number and RTs on counterstereotypic trials (i.e., responses on counterstereotypic trials became faster over time), or both. For both experiments, the correlations did not support a learning explanation: In the 350-ms SOA condition of Experiment 3, the mean correlations for trial number and RTs on both stereotypic trials and counterstereotypic trials were -.02, and in the 250-ms SOA condition of Experiment 4, the mean correlations for trial number and RTs on stereotypic trials and counterstereotypic trials were -.003 and .02, respectively. Moreover, an analysis of block order showed that the counterstereotype strategy was not more effective at short SOAs if participants had first used it at a long SOA. These data suggest that the moderating influence of a counterstereotype strategy on stereotype priming was implemented without learning over the course of these experiments.
A second explanation for the effectiveness of the counterstereotype strategy is that participants effortfully engaged in an intentional strategy on each trial. That is, participants were instructed to determine on each trial if the prime was a masculine or a feminine attribute and then expect an opposite-gender target. We recognize that 250 ms or 350 ms is probably not enough time for participants to engage, focus, and commit attention to the prime and then think of the opposite gender before the actual onset of the target. However, this constraint does not preclude the implementation of intentional strategies based on effortful processing after the onset of the target. For example, participants with a counterstereotype intention may have simply slowed their responding and been more careful in their target judgments than participants with a stereotype intention, an explanation that is consistent with previous research (Monteith, 1993; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987) . The overall slower and slightly more accurate responding in the counterstereotype strategy condition than in the stereotype strategy condition supports this hypothesis. However, careful inspection of the means shows that RTs on counterstereotypic trials were similarly slow across the two conditions and that only the RTs on stereotypic trials differentiated participants with a counterstereotype strategy from participants with a stereotype strategy.
One possible explanation for this pattern of data is that participants may have perceived the prime and the target as a unit (see Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988 ) , either stereotypic or counterstereotypic, and then attempted to reconcile that event with their expectation. If the unit was consistent with their expectation, then participants simply made their target judgment. However, if the unit was inconsistent with their expectation, participants may have taken an additional cognitive step to think of the expectancy-consistent gender before making their judgment for that trial. Assuming that perception and recognition are generally faster for stereotypic events than for counterstereotypic events (because of automatic processes), a counterstereotype expectancy should operate to reduce differential responding to the two types of events. On counterstereotypic trials, recognition is slow but judgment is immediate, whereas on stereotypic trials, recognition is fast but participants delay judgment by attempting to think ofa counterstereotypic target before they make their response. Obviously, this analysis is post hoc, and systematic research is needed to determine whether participants responded in this manner. However, such a strategy is plausible, and it provides an example of how perceivers may creatively implement an intentional strategy even under high cognitive constraints.
Finally, stereotype priming may have been moderated under high cognitive constraints by changes in the underlying cognitive representation of the stereotyped group (Bruner, 1957; Kruglanski, 1989) . That is, because an automatic response depends on the underlying cognitive representation; changes in that representation must affect its automatic expression. More specifically, it is possible that the counterstereotype strategy used in the present research increased the accessibility ofcounterstereotypic information (see Higgins, 1989; Higgins & King, 1981 ) , and because accessible information may influence response in an automatic manner, stereotype priming could have been moderated under conditions in which intentional strategies fail (i.e., under high cognitive constraints). In essence, situationally activated counterstereotypes may have counteracted the influence of automatically activated stereotypes on response. It is important to point out that an accessibility explanation is complementary to one that involves an intentional strategy, and both may have contributed to moderating stereotype priming in the present research. However, an accessibility mechanism raises several interesting questions. For example, if accessibility was increased for counterstereotypes, one would expect that responses would become faster on counterstereotypic trials instead of slower on stereotypic trials. Moreover, an accessibility mechanism presupposes the existence of a counterstereotype, as well as a stereotype schema that can be activated to influence response. The extent to which a group is cognitively represented by what it is not, as well as by what it is, presents an interesting topic for future research.
General Discussion
The goal of the present research was to provide demonstrations of the automatic activation of gender stereotypes and an assessment of the varying conditions of intention and cognitive constraints that moderate this form of stereotype priming. Four experiments were conducted using an established semantic priming procedure and a more general stimulus set than previously tested, and the results provide strong evidence for the automatic activation of stereotypes as well as for conditions under which such effects may be reduced or even eliminated.
Specifically, stereotype priming was revealed in Experiments 1 and 2 through participants' faster responses to stereotypic than counterstereotypic prime-target trials. This pattern of data was obtained with a semantic priming task that did not require deliberation of the prime-target association (i.e., without a stereotype intention) and under high cognitive constraints (250-350-ms SOAs), conditions established to reveal a relatively automatic process. As evidence for the generality of stereotype priming, the effect was demonstrated for both positive and negative trait (Experiment 2) and nontrait (Experiments l and 2) male and female stereotypes. Medium-to-large effect sizes obtained in the experiments suggest that automatic processes may produce considerable and important differences in the processing of stereotypic versus counterstereotypic events.
Notwithstanding the strong and ubiquitous nature of stereotype priming, Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated that such effects may be moderated under particular conditions. Specifically, both perceiver intentions and cognitive constraints were shown to play critical roles in moderating the stereotype priming effect, factors suggested by a number of theories (Bargh, 1994; Brewer, 1988; Devine, 1989; Fiske, 1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Monteith, 1993 ) . We demonstrated that stereotype priming can be eliminated when perceivers have an intention to process counterstereotypic information and sufficient cognitive resources are available. Under these conditions, participants showed a complete reversal of stereotype priming, producing faster responding on counterstereotypic trials than on stereotypic trials. Moreover, consistent with theories of automaticity (Neely, 1977; Posner & Snyder, 1975 ; see also Bargh, 1989 , Kihlstrom, 1990 , we demonstrated that stereotype priming is much more difficult to counter if cognitive resources are severely constrained.
Of great theoretical and practical interest, however, is the intriguing finding that even though participants were not able to fully implement their counterstereotype intention under high cognitive constraints (i.e., stereotype priming was not reversed), they were still able to retain significant control over their response. That is, the stereotype priming effect produced by participants with a counterstereotype intention was statistically insignificant, even at a 250-ms SOA. Moreover, these participants produced significantly weaker priming at a 350-ms SOA than did participants with the opposite stereotype intention. Consistent with previous research (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991 ) , these results suggest that stereotype activation may not be unconditional and stereotypic cues need not result in a stereotypic response. As such, we hope to stimulate research on the automatic and controlled processes involved in both stereotype activation and stereotype application. Such research would have the practical implication of shedding light on the strategies that perceivers may use to combat unwanted automatic influences on their response.
We demonstrated that perceiver intentions and cognitive constraints can interact to produce a gradient of responses from stereotype priming to controlled counterstereotypic responding. These results suggest that an analysis of stereotyping cannot focus exclusively on a single variable (awareness, intention, or cognitive resources) or one operationalization ( e.g., SOA ) to determine the underlying automatic versus controlled process. We concur with recent proposals by Jacoby, Roediger, and their colleagues (Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby, Toth, Lindsay, & Debner, 1992; Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989) that no single measure can be considered to be process pure (i.e., a measure of a purely automatic or a purely controlled process). Researchers must be sensitive to the complexity with which automatic and controlled processes may interact to produce a response.
That automatic processes may be involved in stereotyping is disturbing because such processes reveal the potential to perpetuate prejudice and discrimination independently of more controlled and intentional forms of stereotyping. For example, because people may be either unaware of the automatic influences on their behavior or believe that they have adequately adjusted for those influences, they may misattribute their (stereotypic) response to more obvious or seemingly justifiable causes, such as attributes of the target Bargh, 1992; Jacoby & Kelley, 1992; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) . In addition, targets of automatic stereotyping may be less likely to correctly attribute negative consequences to perceiver bias, disrupting self-protective attributional processes such as those suggested by Crocker and Major ( 1989; Jost & Banaji, 1994) .
The present research supports proposals that stereotypes operate in an automatic fashion as well as proposals that perceivers can control and even eliminate such effects. It is our belief that research on how intentions, goals, and task structure may interact to moderate automatic processes will ultimately lead to a more complete understanding of stereotyping in judgment and behavior.
